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Copyright’s Creative Hierarchy in the
Performing Arts
Michael W. Carroll*
ABSTRACT
Copyright law grants authors certain rights of creative control
over their works. This Article argues that these rights of creative
control are too strong when applied to the performing arts because they
fail to take account of the mutual dependence between writers and
performers to fully realize the work in performance. This failure is
particularly problematic in cases in which the author of a source work,
such as a play or a choreographic work, imposes content-based
restrictions on how a third party may render the work in performance.
This Article then explores how Congress might craft a statutory license
to mitigate this unequal treatment.
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In 2005, two students were anxiously preparing for the
“Cappies” awards show, the high school version of the Tony Awards in
the Washington, D.C. area.1 These students had won an award for
their big number, “Muddy Water,” from Big River, a musical
adaptation of Mark Twain’s Adventures of Huckleberry Finn.2 In the
scene, Huck and Jim float down the river on a raft singing the song on
their way to freedom.3 This production switched the races of the
characters; the student cast as Huck was black and the student cast
as Jim was white.4 Hours before the performance, the licensing agent
for the play alerted the director that the students could not perform
the song because doing so would violate the racial covenant embedded
in the play’s copyright license.5
The Cappies scrapped the
performance, and the students instead improvised a parody mocking
the absurdity of copyright law.6
Does copyright law really give the authors of works used in
performance such extensive control over how others perform the work?
If so, is this a problem? The answer to both questions generally is yes.
The problematic nature of authorial control in the performing arts
arises because of the necessarily collaborative process involved in
realizing the work for the audience. Specifically, the process for
creating a work for the performing arts usually requires collaboration
among
those
who
have
specialized
in
writing
source
works—playwrights, musical composers, and choreographers, for
example—and those who specialize in the skills and art of rendering
these works in live and recorded performance, including producers,
directors, performing artists, and a wide range of other creative
contributors. Writers need performers to bring their texts to life, and
1.
John Harding, Cappies Find Clarity in ‘Muddy Water,’ EXPLOREHOWARD.COM (May
26, 2005), http://archives.explorehoward.com/news/6038572/cappies-find-clarity-muddy-water.
2.
Id.
3.
Id.
4.
Id.
5.
Id. (“Glenelg High School director Carole Lehan told the rights holders that all she
wanted was the best actor for each role. But they said the casting distorted the play’s essential
message. So they decided, in effect, to torpedo the raft.”). Had this issue been litigated, query
whether a court could have enforced this racial license condition consistent with the Equal
Protection Clause. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding racial covenant in deed to
real property to be unenforceable).
6.
Harding, supra note 1.
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performers, other than pure improvisers, need source works to
practice their respective arts.
In light of this particularly salient interdependent relationship,
how should copyright law govern disputes that arise when the writer’s
vision of how a work should be performed clashes with the creative
vision of a producer, director, or performer? An egalitarian would seek
to structure the relationship among these mutually dependent
creators in a way that grants each an opportunity to practice her
respective art.7 Regrettably, copyright law in all countries takes an
elitist approach. In the thrall, or under the pall, of the ideology of
Romantic authorship, copyright grants the author of the source work a
privileged position and the right to veto a live or recorded performance
that does not suit her taste, unless one of copyright’s limitations or
exceptions applies.8
Specifically, in the United States, copyright law contains one
prominent exception to this elitist principle. Colloquially known as
the “cover right,” a statutory license allows musicians to record and to
distribute copies of a “nondramatic musical work” without the
copyright owner’s permission so long as: (1) prior notice is given, and
(2) the recording artist pays the copyright owner a statutory license
fee for each copy produced.9 Combined with the music industry’s
regulated practice of blanket licensing for public performance of
musical works,10 the creator of a cover song can exploit the cover song
in many, but not all, of the ways she might want.11 Other performing
artists do not enjoy similar statutory or blanket licenses, making them
dependent upon the willingness of the source work’s copyright owner
to license if the source work is not yet in the public domain.12 What
7.
See discussion Part II.C.
8.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (granting exclusive rights to copyright owner); see also
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 11(1), Sept. 9, 1886, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 99-27, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne Convention] (“Authors of dramatic,
dramatico-musical and musical works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing: (i) the public
performance of their works, including such public performance by any means or process; (ii) any
communication to the public of the performance of their works.”); infra notes 58-67 and
accompanying text describing instances of authorial control over performance.
9.
See 17 U.S.C. § 115.
10.
See infra text accompanying notes 92-94.
11.
In particular, the creator of a cover song may not create a music video or otherwise
synchronize the song with visual images without a “sync” license, which the creator must obtain
from the copyright owner, because neither the statutory license nor the blanket licenses cover
this use. See, e.g., In re Application of MobiTV, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 2d 206, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(explaining sync licensing in context of music video business).
12.
See infra notes 23-27 and accompanying text. See generally Shane D. Valenzi, Note,
A Rollicking Band of Pirates: Licensing the Exclusive Right of Public Performance in the Theatre
Industry, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 759, 777-82, 785-89 (2012) (detailing the current licensing
structure for theatrical productions and considering statutory or blanket licensing as alternative
schemes).
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principle justifies this differential treatment among performing
artists?
This Article explicates how both copyright law and copyright
licensing practices structure the relationship between composer and
performer differently for music than for the other performing arts.13 It
then explores how copyright might embrace a more egalitarian
approach to creative collaboration in the performing arts through a
more general statutory license.14
The analysis draws from two larger, related projects. The first
studies how and why intellectual property rights generally are
designed with a one-size-fits-all approach, subject to tailoring by
legislation, adjudication, or administrative regulation.15 This project
offers a framework for assessing tailoring measures, including
whether they are designed at the right level of generality.16 The
second project, in the nature of a case study, focuses on the history of
music copyright, both for its intrinsic interest and because many of the
tailoring provisions in the Copyright Act of 1976 concern composed or
recorded music.17 This Article extends both projects by considering
the proposition that the egalitarian principle implicit in the
music-specific cover right justifies a more generalized statutory license
that would (1) apply to the source works in the other performing arts,
but not all works of authorship, and (2) license more than the
production and distribution of a recorded performance.18
For some, the contemplated statutory license misapprehends
the nature of authors’ rights. In particular, proponents of authors’
moral rights are likely to have strong objections to the premises and
the discussion in this Article.19 They may further argue that Article
6bis of the Berne Convention prohibits any Member State from
adopting such a license.20 Respectfully, this Article proceeds from a
13.
See infra Part I.
14.
See infra Part II.
15.
See generally Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in
Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845 (2006) [hereinafter Carroll, One for All];
Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework for Tailoring Intellectual Property
Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361 (2009) [hereinafter Carroll, One Size]; Michael W. Carroll, Patent
Injunctions and the Problem of Uniformity Cost, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 421
(2007).
16.
See generally Carroll, One Size, supra note 15.
17.
See generally Michael W. Carroll, The Struggle for Music Copyright, 57 FLA. L. REV.
907 (2005); Michael W. Carroll, Whose Music Is It Anyway?: How We Came to View Musical
Expression as a Form of Property, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1405 (2004).
18.
See infra Part II.
19.
Cf. Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors’ and Artists’ Moral Rights: A
Comparative Legal & Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 95-96 (1997).
20.
See Berne Convention, supra note 8, art. 6bis (requiring protection of author’s moral
rights).
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different understanding about legal regulation of creative
collaborators. The argument presented herein is informed by a
democratic ethic that treats the creative contributions of authors of
source works and performers with equal dignity.21 This ethic is in
tension with a view of morality that privileges the interests of the
creator over other creative individuals upon whom the initial creator
depends.
I. COPYRIGHT’S HIERARCHY IN THE PERFORMING ARTS
Since its inception three centuries ago, Congress has expanded
copyright law’s subject matter to encompass any “original work[] of
authorship” that an author has embodied in some “tangible medium of
expression.”22 In doing so, copyright has swept numerous creative
communities within its ambit in the name of “promot[ing] the
Progress of Science and useful Arts” by granting rights of exclusivity
to the authors of such works.23
A. Authorial Control and Its Limits
In every field that copyright regulates, tension arises between
those who own copyrights and those who seek to use a copyrighted
work for purposes, or on terms, to which the copyright owner objects.24
Where such disputes arise, copyright law usually offers one of three
resolutions: (1) the copyright owner may deny the putative user any
right to make a desired use, and the owner may destroy any copies of
a work made without authorization;25 (2) the user may conform her
desired use to the terms of a license defined by the law, which usually
limits the scope of permitted uses and often requires payment of a fee
21.
While underspecified and undertheorized, the ethic to which the author refers
derives from the principles of egalitarianism. See generally Richard Arneson, Egalitarianism, in
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2009), available at http://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/egalitarianism. As applied to cultural production, this
ethic is related to semiotic democracy insofar as it favors equal opportunities to conceive of, and
share publicly, one’s creative expression. Cf. JOHN FISKE, TELEVISION CULTURE 239 (Routledge
1999) (1987) (coining phrase “semiotic democracy” in connection with active television
viewership); William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1203, 1217-18 (1998).
22.
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
23.
See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (encompassing literary, musical,
dramatic, choreographic, pictorial, graphic, sculptural, audiovisual, sound recording, and
architectural works).
24.
See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1269-74, 1276
(11th Cir. 2001) (holding that retelling of Gone with the Wind was fair use).
25.
See 17 U.S.C. § 503 (authorizing impoundment and disposition of infringing
articles).
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to the copyright owner;26 or (3) the use falls within a limitation on, or
exception to, the owner’s exclusive rights, permitting the user to
exercise her background right to free expression without payment and
over the objection of the copyright owner.27 Designating a use as a fair
use is one example of this third outcome. Theoretically, a fourth
resolution would allow the copyright owner to prevent the use on
condition that the owner pays the user (a reverse statutory license).28
Copyright law’s limitations and exceptions derive from the
recognition of the public benefits that come from ensuring rights of
access or use and the need to restrict the copyright owner’s veto right.
As discussed in greater detail below, a theoretical framework is under
development that would redress problems caused by full
copyright-owner control with a limitation or exception.29 In practice,
the actual contours of most of these tailored exceptions and limitations
reflect not only political compromises between representatives of
corporate copyright owners and user groups,30 but also reflect the
principle that full copyright-owner control over a work’s use must be
subject to certain limits to solve particular problems.
Of the
exceptions and limitations that are specific to certain subject matter,
most target musical works or sound recordings as meriting a statutory
license or a right of reuse without license.31 The reasons for music’s
distinct treatment vary, but generally stem from the need to use music
as an input to a variety of follow-on uses, or to the transaction costs
associated with licensing music from multiple copyright owners.32
This Article contends that the problems that stimulated
enactment of limitations or exceptions applicable to rights in music

26.
See, e.g., id. §§ 111 (cable retransmission), 114-116 (musical works), 119 (satellite
retransmission of distant signals), 122 (satellite retransmission of local signals).
27.
See, e.g., Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1269-74.
28.
Thanks to James Grimmelmann for this suggestion. Cf. Guido Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed. Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,
85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (offering a more general taxonomy).
29.
See discussion infra Part II.C.1.
30.
See generally Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987) (describing legislative negotiations leading to the Copyright Act of
1976); Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275
(1989).
31.
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 110(6)-(7) (exempting some performances of nondramatic
musical works); id. § 112 (licensing ephemeral recordings); id. § 114 (tailoring rights in sound
recordings); id. § 115 (licensing reproduction and distribution of copies of nondramatic musical
works); id. § 116 (licensing nondramatic musical works for use in jukeboxes); id. § 513 (codifying
performing rights consent decree); id. § 1008 (exempting certain uses of certain digital recording
devices).
32.
See generally Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 673 (2003) (examining and explaining complexity of copyright law’s application
to musical works and sound recordings).
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are also problems in other performing arts; therefore, these problems
may merit a similar response. This Article defines the “performing
arts” as those creative fields in which a source work must be rendered
through the physical interpretation by one or more persons for the
work to be fully realized. This Article focuses on those creative fields
that generally involve a mutually dependent relationship between the
author of a source work and those who interpret the text in a live or
recorded setting for the benefit of an audience. At a minimum, the
performing arts for present purposes include theatre, motion pictures,
music, dance, pantomime, and performance art.33 One might well
include comedy, poetry, spoken word, and the public performance of
literary works, such as audiobooks; however, this Article hesitates to
be so expansive. Performance of illusions and magic tricks appears to
be a borderline case for which copyright’s role is evolving and rights of
creative control are not yet fully specified.34 The power dynamics
concerning creative control between an author of source work and a
performer in comedy and spoken word appear to favor the performer.35
In the case of the nondramatic literary work, the author does not
depend on the actor to reach her audience. Moreover, the author’s
desire for control over who voices the work in an audiobook seems
more deserving in light of the relative degree of creative contributions
of author and actor.
A key premise of this Article’s argument is that the problems of
access and reuse in the performing arts are different in kind, rather
than degree, from the problems that appear in other creative fields.
To be sure, the rights of creative control do pose poignant problems for
follow-on creators generally. For example, authors of literary works
frequently wish to retell, reimagine, or rework a preexisting narrative;
they also often borrow characters or settings.36 In some cases, a
copyright owner may deny a license to reuse or borrow merely because
33.
Performance art is a contested, interdisciplinary form of performance that has a
looser connection to narrative than is traditionally associated with drama; the Wikipedia
description is sufficiently reliable to support this general point. See Performance Art, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Performance_art (last updated Apr. 10, 2012).
34.
See, e.g., Teller v. Dogge, 12 Civ. 00591(D. Nev. Apr. 11, 2012) available at
http://ia601207.us.archive.org/28/items/gov.uscourts.nvd.86951/gov.uscourts.nvd.86951.1.0.pdf
(famous magician alleges infringement of his trick, Shadows, registered as a “dramatic work”
with the U.S. Copyright Office).
35.
See generally Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, Reply, From Corn to Norms:
How IP Entitlements Affect What Stand-Up Comedians Create, 95 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 57 (2009);
Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of
Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787
(2008).
36.
See, e.g., Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 83 (2d Cir. 2010) (agreeing that “Salinger
is likely to succeed on the merits of his copyright infringement claim” with respect to defendant’s
unauthorized borrowing of plot and character elements from The Catcher in the Rye).
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the user cannot afford the owner’s price.37 In many other cases,
however, the copyright owner, often the author or her estate, seeks to
censor certain kinds of retelling and to control the fate of the narrative
in popular culture for the duration of copyright.38 In such cases, the
copyright owner can frustrate the user’s creative impulses in dramatic
fashion; she can obtain a court order requiring that the user’s books be
pulped39 unless fair use grants the follow-on author a reprieve.40 One
might respond to the presence of this tension across creative fields by
arguing that copyright should be generally more solicitous of the
user’s creative requirements; that is, it should be reformed to become
only a right of compensation rather than a right of control. This
Article does not take up this argument. Rather, it accepts the general
case that rights of exclusion, backed by the power of injunctive relief,
are necessary to achieve copyright’s purposes.
What makes the performing arts different from other creative
fields is the condition of mutual dependence that exists between the
author of the source work and the many creative persons upon whom
the author of the source work relies for a work to be fully realized.
Both the authors and the other creative parties contribute individual
creativity to the collective performance.
A range of creative
individuals sits between the author of the source work and the
performer, such as directors, producers, dramaturges, and
cinematographers. Even though producers, directors, and performers
may qualify as “authors” of their contributions under copyright law,
this Article treats this group collectively as “performers” to focus on
the mutually dependent relationship between the writers of source
works and those who render them in performance. Even film directors
considered auteurs work from a script.41
The landscape is varied with respect to independent rights
owned by creative contributors. In the theatre, a few cases have

37.
See, e.g., Steve Lambert, Music Streaming Service Rejects Canada, GLOBE & MAIL
(Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/technology/personal-tech/music-stream
ing-service-rejects-canada/article1720247 (reporting that music service Pandora abandoned
plans to offer its service in Canada because of the high cost of copyright licenses).
38.
See, e.g., Salinger, 607 F.3d at 68; Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F.
Supp. 2d 1357, 1386 (N.D. Ga.) (granting preliminary injunction enjoining distribution of The
Wind Done Gone, a novel reimagining Gone With the Wind), vacated, 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir.
2001).
39.
See 17 U.S.C. § 503 (2006) (authorizing judicial orders to impound or dispose of
infringing articles).
40.
See id. § 107 (providing for fair use).
41.
See, e.g., Doree Shafrir, Bored of Directors: Why Can’t a Screenwriter Be an Auteur,
Too?, SLATE (Oct. 27, 2006, 5:07 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_gist/
2006/10/bored_of_directors.html (describing conflict between screenwriter and film director
considered an auteur).

2012]

COPYRIGHT HIERARCHY IN THE PERFORMING ARTS

805

contested the issue of whether a director’s stage directions are
independent works of authorship42 and this subject is a perennial
favorite for student-authored legal commentary.43 Playwrights are
having none of it:
The Council of the Guild has become aware that directors, dramaturgs and other
theatrical collaborators have from time to time claimed copyright and other ownership
interests in any such changes or contributions for which they claim to be responsible. . . .
Such claims and actions infringe on the rights of dramatists to own and control their
plays, and may inhibit the opportunities of other professionals, and audiences, to
participate in the re-creation and enjoyment of the play.44

Performers fare differently, depending upon the art. An actor,
a dancer, and a musician each face a range of creative choices when
deciding how to perform a role or a piece of music. These creative
choices can be fixed in a tangible medium simply by recording the
performance.45 On copyright’s first principles, these creative choices
are sufficiently original to qualify the performer as an author of her
performance.46 This view does not enjoy full acceptance, however.
Usually the issue arises when a collaborator asserts rights as a joint
author, and courts must address the intent of the parties, whether the
collaborator’s contribution is independently copyrightable, and
42.
See, e.g., Einhorn v. Mergatroyd Prods., 426 F. Supp. 2d 189, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2006);
Mantello v. Hall, 947 F. Supp. 92, 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
43.
E.g., Beth Freemal, Note, Theatre, Stage Directions & Copyright Law, 71 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1017 (1996); David Leichtman, Note, Most Unhappy Collaborators: An Argument Against
the Recognition of Property Ownership in Stage Directions, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 683
(1996); Jessica Litman, Note, Copyright in the Stage Direction of a Broadway Musical, 7 ART & L.
309 (1982) (student note by now-Professor Litman); Jennifer J. Maxwell, Comment, Making a
Federal Case for Copyrighting Stage Directions: Einhorn v. Mergatroyd Productions, 7 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 393 (2008); see also Margit Livingston, Inspiration or Imitation:
Copyright Protection for Stage Directions, 50 B.C. L. REV. 427 (2009) (arguing for copyrightability
of stage directions).
44.
Jessica Litman, The Invention of Common Law Play Right, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1381, 1423 n.263 (2010) (quoting statement of the Dramatists Guild of America on Dramatist
Copyright and Intellectual Property Rights). The Guild’s web site has changed its content, but
Internet Archive has an archived copy. See Guild Statements-Dramatists’ Copyright &
Intellectual Property Rights, DRAMATISTS GUILD AM. (May 16, 2008), http://web.archive.org/web/
20080516092242/http://www.dramatistsguild.com/about_statements_copyright.aspx; see also
Janine Carter, What Light from Darkness Grows, WWW.WHATLIGHT.COM (2001), http://www.
whatlight.com/treatment-outline.html (reproducing Dramatist Guild’s position in opening of
script).
45.
Although performers seeking to claim copyright might fix their work by recording,
performers’ guilds frequently demand in their contracts the right to control whether a live
performance is recorded. See, e.g., ACTORS’ EQUITY ASS’N, AGREEMENT AND RULES GOVERNING
EMPLOYMENT UNDER THE ASSOCIATION OF NON-PROFIT THEATRE COMPANIES (ANTC) ¶ 38(A)(1)
(2010) (prohibiting recording of auditions or performances in which Equity members are
employed without “the express prior written permission of Actors’ Equity Association and under
terms and conditions established by it”).
46.
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (granting copyright in any “original work[] of authorship”
that has been “fixed in any tangible medium of expression”).
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whether the parties’ contributions are works made for hire.47 Courts
treat musicians, producers, and some sound engineers as authors of
their recorded performances.48 Nevertheless, courts recognize only
some collaborators in theatrical productions as authors, and actors
and dancers usually are not treated as authors.49
Rather than seeking recognition within copyright law, some
actors have sought control over their rendition of the characters they
have embodied through the state-law right of publicity, which has
yielded mixed results.50 Critics often refer to actors as having a
“trademark” style, but these styles are not actually protected as
marks.51 Similarly, the patent system has not attracted performers

47.
See infra note 48.
48.
See David Nimmer & Peter S. Menell, Sound Recordings, Works for Hire, and the
Termination-of-Transfers Time Bomb, 49 J. OF THE COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 387 (2001) (arguing that
musical performers and producers, as authors, are asserting rights to terminate transfer their
interests in sound recordings made after January 1, 1978); see also Copyright Law Revision:
Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3 of the Committee of the Judiciary House of Representatives
on H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, H.R. 6835, 89th Cong. 1863 (Sept. 2, 1965) (testimony of
Abraham Kaminstein) (identifying elements of authorship in sound recordings).
49.
See, e.g., Thomson v. Larson, 147 F. 3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding a dramturg as
not a joint author but as author of independently copyrighted contributions); Erickson v. Trinity
Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1071-74 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that actors must both demonstrate
that their contributions to a play would be independently copyrightable and that the playwright
intended for the actors to be considered joint authors); Childress v. Taylor, 945 F. 2d 500 (2d Cir.
1991) (holding joint author’s contribution must be independently copyrightable); Supreme
Records, Inc. v. Decca Records, Inc. 90 F. Supp. 904, 909 (S.D. Cal. 1950) (treating as absurd the
proposition that actors could claim exclusive rights in their renditions of famous characters such
as Henry VIII or Hamlet); see also Douglas M. Nevin, Comment, No Business Like Show
Business: Copyright Law, the Theatre Industry, and the Dilemma of Rewarding Collaboration, 53
EMORY L.J. 1533, 1543-46 (2004) (reviewing joint authorship and work for hire doctrines as
applied to theatre). In some settings, such as Chicago’s improvisational troupe, Second City,
ownership in copyright to the works created by the troupe is unified through work-made-for-hire
agreements. See Susan Keller, Comment, Collaboration in Theater: Problems and Copyright
Solutions, 33 UCLA L. REV. 891, 915-19 (1986). In the absence of such agreements, actors and
dancers arguably could claim copyright in their creative contributions if fixed in tangible
medium of expression. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining requirements for a work made for hire).
50.
See, e.g., Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting a fact
dispute for the jury on the publicity right asserted by the actors who played characters Norm and
Cliff on television show Cheers against airport bar chain that had acquired a copyright license);
McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 917-23 (3d Cir. 1994) (leaving right of publicity issue for trial);
Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 836-37 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that
right of publicity is preempted by copyright); Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright Preemption and
the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 199, 204 n.10 (2002) (collecting cases).
51.
In the European Union, this would appear to be a plausible strategy. See Christina
Michalos, Sport and the Registration of Movement Marks, 5RB (Dec. 2, 2003), available at
http://www.5rb.com/docs/Sport%20and%20the%20Registration%20of%20Movement%20Marks.
pdf (describing U.K. Trademark No. 2130164 for the movement of two characters slowly raising
and replacing bowler hats in unison).
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who have styled themselves as inventors by, for example, claiming to
have invented a particular type of method acting.52
B. The Problem of Authorial Control
Whether copyright law’s preference for authors over performers
is a problem depends both on how the law works in practice and
whether one is comfortable with this state of affairs. In practice, star
performers frequently invert copyright’s hierarchy. Looking across
the landscape of the big-dollar performing arts, the star power of the
performers or directors often diminishes the writers’ ability to assert
creative control.53 The average moviegoer might easily be able to
name the starring actors or the director of the last movie she saw; on
the other hand, she may have a difficult time remembering the names
of the screenwriters.54 Actors can use the leverage derived from this
discrepancy to diminish writers’ control. On Broadway, writers enjoy
somewhat greater power, but star actors also are a staple of
productions on the Great White Way.55 In music, those who composed
popular songs enjoyed considerable market power during the first half
of the twentieth century.56 Hit songwriters who do not perform their
own music still enjoy important recognition, but it hardly compares to
the attention given to the performers for whom they write.57
While star performers and directors may enjoy considerable
creative control, in most cases the assertion of authorial sovereignty

52.
For a database of patents pertaining to the arts, see Patent Database, PATENTING
ART, http://www.patenting-art.com/database/dbase1-e.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2012); also see
Robert M. Kunstadt, F. Scott Kieff, & Robert G. Kramer, Are Sports Moves Next in IP Law?,
NAT’L L. J., May 20, 1996, at C1.
53.
Cf. Gavin Polone, Four Star Screenwriters Talk About Rewrite Hell, VULTURE (Feb.
29,
2012),
http://www.vulture.com/2012/02/polone-screenwriters-rewrites-hollywood.html
(interviewing four successful screenwriters on the common Hollywood practice of firing writers
and hiring rewriters).
54.
See, e.g., Gavin Polone, Four Star Screenwriters Talk about Rewrite Hell, THE
VULTURE, Feb. 29, 2012, at http://www.vulture.com/2012/02/polone-screenwriters-rewriteshollywood.html (interviewing four successful screenwriters on the practice of firing writers and
hiring rewriters that is common in Hollywood).
55.
See Stars on Stage, N.Y. THEATER GUIDE, http://www.newyorktheatreguide.com/
starsonstage/index.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2012) (identifying twenty-four stars acting in plays
on Broadway in upcoming months).
56.
See, e.g., Tin Pan Alley: “Popular Standards”, SONGWRITERS HALL FAME,
http://www.songwritershalloffame.org/exhibits/eras/C1106 (last visited Apr. 25, 2012) (providing
biographical information about the numerous inductees who penned the tunes that became
standards in the American songbook).
57.
See Nekesa Mumbi Moody, Do Pop Stars Really Write Their Own Hits?, CBSNEWS
(Feb. 11, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-207_162-3089948.html; cf. ASCAP Celebrates the
Songwriters Behind Pop Music’s Biggest Hits at Annual Awards Ceremony in Hollywood, ASCAP
(Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.ascap.com/press/2011/0427_Pop_Biggest_Hits.aspx.
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over public performance is widespread among those who write for the
performing arts. A particularly strong form of authorial control comes
in the form of license conditions that include race-based and
gender-based casting prohibitions. Two of the more famous examples
are the Gershwins and Samuel Beckett. As Professor Funmi Arewa
recounts, the Gershwins, and now their estate, will grant licenses to
perform Porgy and Bess only if the cast is black, and the estate has
even asserted rights to limit scholars from creating alternative
interpretations.58
Perhaps inconsistently, the estate itself has
launched a revised version on Broadway, which audiences met with
less than critical acclaim.59 Samuel Beckett notoriously resisted
granting licenses or approval for performances of Waiting for Godot
except with an all-male cast.60 Even when playwrights or their
estates allow for standardized licensing through an intermediary, the
standard license includes content controls.
For example, the
Dramatists Play Service offers community and educational theatres
licenses to perform a number of plays at reasonable prices.61 These
groups can stage Edward Albee’s Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf? for
seventy-five dollars per performance.62 However, the license imposes
significant content-based restrictions on the licensee. In particular:
(1) The play(s) must be presented only as published in the Dramatists Play Service, Inc.
authorized acting edition, without any changes, additions, alterations or deletions to the
text and title(s). These restrictions shall include, without limitation, not altering,
updating or amending the time, locales or settings of the play(s) in any way. The gender
of the characters shall also not be changed or altered in any way, e.g., by costume or
physical change.63

58.
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Copyright on Catfish Row: Musical Borrowing, Porgy and
Bess, and Unfair Use, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 277, 324-27 (2006).
59.
Patrick Healy, The Songs Remain the Same, but Broadway Heirs Call the Shots,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/09/theater/with-porgy-on-broadwaygershwin-heirs-flex-their-rights.html?pagewanted=all.
60.
WILLIAM HUTCHINGS, SAMUEL BECKETT’S WAITING FOR GODOT: A REFERENCE GUIDE
93-94 (2005) (“This practice has touched off a continuing debate within theatrical and literary
communities over the extent to which a playwright or his or her estate can or should have
absolute control over the production of his or her works.”); see also id. at 93-94, 96 (explaining
limits on Beckett’s ability to obtain injunctions against productions with women in the cast and
his response by requiring in subsequent licenses that a disclaimer be announced to the audience
prior to each performance).
61.
See
Nonprofessional
Licensing,
DRAMATISTS
PLAY
SERVICE,
INC.,
http://www.dramatists.com/text/npalinks.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2012).
62.
Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf?, DRAMATISTS PLAY SERVICE, INC., http://www.
dramatists.com/cgi-bin/db/single.asp?index=0&key=1623 (last visited Apr. 9, 2012). Dramatists
Play Service, Inc., also charges a fee for the “authorized acting edition.” See id.; infra text
accompanying note 63.
63.
Application for Nonprofessional Stage Performance Rights, DRAMATISTS PLAY
SERVICE, INC., https://www.dramatists.com/cgi-bin/db/secure/autonpa.asp (last visited Apr. 9,
2012).
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Such time, place, and manner restrictions imposed by copyright
license constrain performers’ creative freedom to interpret source
works imaginatively. In contrast, when copyright expires and a work
enters the public domain, community theatre groups have exercised
with gusto the freedom nurtured by the public domain, particularly
with source works such as the plays of William Shakespeare. For
example, a local theatre group recently staged a science-fiction version
of The Tempest at a nearby public high school, and American
University’s public radio station broadcasted the performance live. No
copyright issues arose because the source work is in the public domain
rather than subject to a restrictive copyright license.64
A few other examples further illustrate this understanding
about the hierarchical relation between author and performer.
Choreographer Antony Tudor wrote in his will:
I request my Trustee, in order to insure the integrity of my ballets in performance, to
require as a condition of any agreement entered into or permission given for
performance of any of my ballets that the performance be based on the best available
record of the ballet and, specifically, if the ballet has been notated by the Dance
Notation Bureau or by The Institute of Choreology, that the Bureau or the Institute be
consulted and the performance based upon its notation.65

Musical composers share this view as well. “‘I do think that, as
composers and writers, we should leave pretty specific instructions to
our estates about how we want our work to be protected,’ said John
Kander, the eighty-four year-old composer who, with Fred Ebb, wrote
the scores for hits like Cabaret and Chicago.”66
Ironically, while playwrights enjoy a significant degree of
control, this does not readily translate into significant revenue. As
Professor Jessica Litman relates:
Today, playwrights in America retain both copyright ownership and creative control in
their plays. Those strong copyright rights have not, however, made playwriting
remunerative. A 2009 study by the Theatre Development Fund concluded that it is no
longer possible for even the most successful playwrights to earn a living from
productions of their plays. Working playwrights need to supplement their incomes with
teaching or with writing scripts for film or television under work made for hire
contracts.67

Copyright law creates a hierarchy of creative control in the
performing arts by recognizing those who compose source works as
authors who have exclusive rights to determine how, and by whom,
64.
Sophia Bushong, The Tempest! In! Space!, WASH. CITY PAPER, Mar. 2, 2012,
http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/blogs/artsdesk/theater/2012/03/02/the-tempest-in-space.
65.
Francis Yeoh, The Value of Documenting Dance, BALLET-DANCE MAG. (June 2007),
http://www.ballet-dance.com/200706/articles/Yeoh200706.html (citation omitted) (quoting Antony
Tudor’s will).
66.
Healy, supra note 59.
67.
Litman, supra note 44, at 1424 (footnotes omitted).
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their works will be performed.68 The exclusive rights of authorial
control produces a creative hierarchy specific to the performing arts
because authors of source works depend upon the creative
contributions of performers to present the work to an audience in its
intended form.69 These performers depend upon the authors of source
works because audience expectations lead to demand for performances
of familiar works. While these creative communities are mutually
dependent, copyright law grants authors of source works the right to
deny public performance except on the author’s terms subject to
certain limitations and exceptions, such as fair use.70 This Article
regards this unequal treatment of codependent creators unjustified.
II. TAILORING RIGHTS TO RECOGNIZE CREATIVE CODEPENDENCY
As a general matter, copyright law provides the same set of
exclusive rights to all works of authorship,71 but international and
U.S. copyright law contain a number of provisions that lawmakers
tailored to provide differential treatment depending upon the subject
matter of a work of authorship.72 Other provisions differentiate on the
basis of the author’s identity.73 In addition, the courts have improved
the functioning of the law’s general standards by applying them in a
manner that differentiates on the basis of subject matter to
accommodate particular issues of incentives and access in context.74
A. Tailoring in Theory
Whether these tailored provisions improve copyright law
depends upon one’s theory of tailoring. Current law lacks a general
theory that explains both why copyright’s default entitlements should
be one-size-fits-all as well as why, when, and how the law should
tailor these otherwise uniform provisions.75 When viewed through the
68.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2006).
69.
Cf. Moody, supra note 57.
70.
Compare 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (granting exclusive right “to perform [a] copyrighted
work publicly”), with id. § 107 (subjecting the public performance right to a fair use exception).
71.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
72.
Congress has granted authors of certain types of work additional rights. See, e.g., 17
USC § 106A (works of visual art). For other classes of author, such as architects, see id. § 120,
and authors of sound recordings, see id. § 106(6), Congress has limited the exclusive rights
available. Similarly, Congress has limited the scope of rights in functional pictorial, graphical, or
sculptural works. See id. § 113.
73.
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 105 (placing works of the United States Government in the
public domain in the United States).
74.
See generally Stacey L. Dogan & Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law and Subject Matter
Specificity: The Case of Computer Software, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 203 (2005).
75.
Carroll, One for All, supra note 15, at 861-71, 875-78.
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prism of law and economics, copyright law imposes “uniformity cost”
on society because one-size-fits-all rights are likely broader than
necessary in many cases and not broad enough in others.76 The
economic justification for copyright law supports the argument for
uniform rights as an initial policy.77 This justification holds that even
though it would be socially less costly for the government to directly
subsidize the costs of producing and distributing creative works,
granting copyrights to authors is a preferable policy because the
government lacks sufficient information to choose which creators and
distributors to subsidize. Copyright places the risk of failure on the
creator or distributor rather than on taxpayers. However, as authors,
publishers, user groups and policymakers gain experience with, and
understanding of, the economic effects of how copyright affects
different industries, policymakers can use this information to tailor
copyright to refine its balance between providing incentives and rights
of access.78
Thus, when done carefully, tailoring rights or remedies
improves copyright’s effectiveness as a means of “promot[ing]
Progress . . . and the useful Arts.”79 Even though not all of the tailored
provisions in current law necessarily have been “done right,” the
presence of these provisions as a whole demonstrates the problem of
uniformity cost: these provisions were enacted only through contested
legislative processes that required, in some cases, substantial resource
commitments.80 While some of these investments may have resulted
simply from an interest group seeking a particular advantage,81 others
reflect lobbying in response to demonstrable uniformity costs.82 As a
structural matter, Congress has created legislative tailoring in U.S.
76.
Id. at 848.
77.
See Carroll, One Size, supra note 15, at 1391-94.
78.
See id. at 1422-23.
79.
See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
80.
See, e.g., Valenzi, supra note 12, at 771-72 (detailing the expansive efforts of the
theatre and music lobbies to extend increased copyright protection to theatrical and musical
works at the turn of the twentieth century).
81.
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 110(10) (2006) (exempting from infringement liability a public
performance of a “nondramatic literary or musical work in the course of a social function which is
organized and promoted by a nonprofit veterans’ organization or a nonprofit fraternal
organization to which the general public is not invited”).
82.
For example, without the safe harbors from monetary liability tailored for Internet
service providers (ISPs), it is doubtful that companies such as YouTube could have succeeded to
the extent that they have, even though the safe harbor applies only to a small percentage of the
content on the site. See id. § 512(c) (removing monetary liability for infringement by reason of
storage at the direction of a user); see also Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., Nos. 10-3270-cv,
10-3342-cv, 2012 WL 1130851, at *1 (2d Cir. Apr. 5, 2012) (holding most of YouTube’s conduct
fell within § 512 safe harbors); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 667 F.3d
1022 (9th Cir. 2011) (same for Veoh).
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copyright law through exceptions and limitations to the exclusive
rights granted in section 106, rather than as direct redefinitions of
such rights.83 As interpreted by the courts to date, this structure
places the burden on a user to show that her use of a copyrighted work
falls within the scope of an exception or limitation, once the copyright
owner has proven prima facie infringement.84
This author’s work to date proposes a framework for tailoring
rights to improve intellectual property law’s function as a matter of
economic policy.85 But economic efficiency is not the only value to be
considered in relation to copyright law. Tailoring rights may also be
an appropriate response to give effect to these other values. Copyright
law stimulates investments in some speech, but it also suppresses
other speech.86 As a result, concerns about content-based regulation
also may inform arguments for tailoring copyright law or for
disregarding content-based tailoring measures, regardless of their
effects on efficiency. It is partially for this reason that Justice Holmes
avoided the tailored provision of the 1831 Act, as modified in 1874,
which limited protection to “pictorial illustrations or works connected
with the fine arts,”87 and announced the now-famous
non-discrimination principle in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing
Co.: “It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial
illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.”88
While challenging in some circumstances, tailoring copyright either
through legislation or judicial interpretation can, and has, improved
the law’s ability to foster investments in cultural production, while
relieving the pressures caused by a one-size-fits-all approach to
economically heterogeneous creative sectors.

83.
See, e.g., id. §§ 108, 110-122 (defining limitations and exceptions to exclusive rights
granted to copyright owners).
84.
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 567 (1985).
85.
See generally Carroll, One Size, supra note 15.
86.
See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 889-92 (2012) (emphasizing limits of First
Amendment on copyright owner's exclusive rights). See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Essay, Copy
This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE
L.J. 535 (2004) (arguing that emphasis on transformative use in fair use inquiry undervalues
free speech contributions of verbatim copying in some contexts).
87.
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) (quoting Act of
June 18, 1874, ch. 301, 18 Stat. 78, 79).
88.
Id. at 251.
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B. The Music Exception in Copyright
The Copyright Act of 1976 treats music differently than the
other performing arts because the Act includes numerous tailored
limitations or exceptions applicable to musical works or sound
recordings.89 For example, section 110 groups together a range of
limitations and exceptions that apply to the copyright owner’s
exclusive rights of public performance and public display, three of
which apply only to nondramatic musical works.90 Section 115
provides the “cover right,” a statutory license that allows for the
recording of a nondramatic musical work that the copyright owner has
already recorded and publicly distributed.91 In addition to these
statutory provisions, public performance rights in the music industry
have been brought under collective management subject to judicial
oversight.92 The very large majority of professional songwriters and
music publishers license the public performance of their nondramatic
musical works with one of three performing-rights organizations,
ASCAP, BMI, or SESAC, with the first two sharing most of the
market equally.93 While not formally statutory licenses, the blanket
licenses offered by these entities operate very similarly because the
owners of the musical works’ copyrights have ceded the rights to
performing-rights organizations to control individual uses of the
copyrighted work in exchange for a right to receive compensation.94
Taken together, these provisions provide significant, but not
complete, equalization of creative control between musical composers
and those who perform their music. This Section explores the
rationale for these provisions to investigate whether this rationale
supports broadening them within the music industry and also
extending these provisions to the other performing arts. While the
section 110 provisions are more directly aimed at authorizing

89.
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 110, 114-116, 1008 (2006). While not all sound recordings are
of musical works, the legislative history makes clear that most provisions that provide
distinctive treatment to sound recording are targeted at the recorded music industry.
90.
Id. § 110(5)-(7).
91.
Id. § 115(a).
92.
See In re Application of MobiTV, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 2d 206, 211-12 (S.D.N.Y. 2010);
see also BMI v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1979) (holding that blanket licensing agencies were
not engaging in per se antitrust violations).
93.
See In re Application of MobiTV, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 2d at 211-12.
94.
See id. at 211 (“A blanket license is a license that gives the music user the right to
perform all of the works in the repertory of a performing rights organization (‘PRO’) such as
ASCAP, the fee for which does not vary depending on how much of the music from the repertory
the user actually uses. ASCAP negotiates with and collects license fees from entities that
perform music publicly. ASCAP then distributes the collected royalties to its members based on a
system of performance surveys and credits.”).
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performance without the copyright owner’s permission, this Section
begins with section 115 because (1) the policy debate around this
provision has more directly engaged with the question of composer
control versus performer access, and (2) this provision provides
compensation to the composer of a source work in exchange for the
license to render it in recorded performance.
1. Section 115
Section 115 in the current Act is the successor to the first
statutory-license provision in U.S. copyright law, which Congress
enacted in section 1(e) of the Copyright Act of 1909.95 Under the
current version of the license, the copyright owner of a piece of popular
music, or any other “nondramatic musical work,” has the exclusive
right to first distribute recordings of the musical work to the U.S.
public.96 After this first distribution, any other member of the public
may make use of a statutory license to make her own recording of the
musical work and to distribute these recordings—even if the copyright
owner objects—subject to the terms and conditions of the license.97
Thus, the first authorized distribution acts as a temporal trigger for
the availability of the license; a precondition consistent with the moral
right of divulgation, granted in many other countries, under which the
author has the exclusive right to make the work public.98
95.
Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075 (current version at
17 U.S.C. § 115(e)).
96.
17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
97.
Id. § 115(a)
In the case of nondramatic musical works, the exclusive rights provided by clauses (1)
and (3) of section 106, to make and to distribute phonorecords of such works, are
subject to compulsory licensing under the conditions specified by this section.
(a) Availability and Scope of Compulsory License.—
(1) When phonorecords of a nondramatic musical work have been
distributed to the public in the United States under the authority of the
copyright owner, any other person, including those who make phonorecords
or digital phonorecord deliveries, may, by complying with the provisions of
this section, obtain a compulsory license to make and distribute
phonorecords of the work. A person may obtain a compulsory license only if
his or her primary purpose in making phonorecords is to distribute them to
the public for private use, including by means of a digital phonorecord
delivery. A person may not obtain a compulsory license for use of the work
in the making of phonorecords duplicating a sound recording fixed by
another, unless: (i) such sound recording was fixed lawfully; and (ii) the
making of the phonorecords was authorized by the owner of copyright in
the sound recording or, if the sound recording was fixed before February
15, 1972, by any person who fixed the sound recording pursuant to an
express license from the owner of the copyright in the musical work or
pursuant to a valid compulsory license for use of such work in a sound
recording.
Id.
98.
See, e.g., Hansmann & Santilli, supra note 19.

2012]

COPYRIGHT HIERARCHY IN THE PERFORMING ARTS

815

To satisfy the conditions of the license, the licensee must: (1)
serve notice on the copyright owner prior to the public distribution of
the licensee’s recordings, (2) pay the copyright owner a statutory
license fee, and (3) refrain from altering the basic melody or
“fundamental character” of the work.99
As Professor Howard Abrams recounts in detail, Congress first
introduced this license into the law to undermine the market power of
a cartel that had formed between a group of music publishers and the
principal manufacturer of player-piano rolls.100 Over time, however,
the rationale for granting a right of access to source works through the
license has shifted from undermining monopoly power to satisfying
industry expectations and standardizing licensing conditions.
In the early stages of the revision process that led to enactment
of the Copyright Act of 1976, the Register of Copyrights proposed
eliminating the statutory license.101 The Register asserted that the
danger of monopoly had passed, and argued that “the fundamental
principle of copyright—that the author is to have the exclusive right to
control the commercial exploitation of his work—should apply to the
recording of music, as it is applied to all other kinds of works and to
other means of exploiting music.”102 In this view, in the absence of the
statutory license, negotiated licenses would be available for most
musical works. However, “the author or publisher could refuse a
license to a recorder whom he considered irresponsible or for a
recording he considered undesirable, and the royalty rate would be
fixed by free negotiation.”103 Maintaining a guaranteed right of access
for the recording party did not, in this view, carry any weight.104

99.
17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (providing that the licensee may arrange the musical work “to
conform it to the style or manner of interpretation of the performance involved, but the
arrangement shall not change the basic melody or fundamental character of the work, and shall
not be subject to protection as a derivative work under this title, except with the express consent
of the copyright owner”).
100.
Howard B. Abrams, Copyright’s First Compulsory License, 26 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 215, 217-21 (2010).
101.
Id. at 222 (citing REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, 87TH CONG., REP. ON THE GENERAL
REVISIONS OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW (1961)).
102.
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, 87TH CONG., REP. ON THE GENERAL REVISIONS OF THE
U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 33 (1961) [hereinafter REGISTER’S REPORT].
103.
Id. at 34 (emphasis added).
104.
Id. at 35 (emphasis added). The Register of Copyrights continued:
We have previously mentioned the fundamental principle of copyright that the author
should have the exclusive right to exploit the market for his work, except where this
would conflict with the public interest. In the situation prevailing in 1909, the public
interest was thought to require the compulsory license to forestall the danger of a
monopoly of musical recordings. The compulsory license is no longer needed for that
purpose, and we see no other public interest that now requires its retention.
Id. (emphasis added).
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Many incumbent stakeholders in the music industry, contrary
to the Register’s view, believed that retaining the license, while
improving the statutory rate, would be preferable; they preferred to
operate under familiar conditions rather than confront the
uncertainties associated with license negotiations. This sentiment
was strong enough that the compulsory license remained a fixture in
copyright law even though the license enshrines a principle of limiting
creator control to guarantee access in the case of sources works for one
of the performing arts.105
Arguably the license accomplishes very little in practice
because the industry has created a private workaround through the
Harry Fox Agency. This agency, for example, issued 2.44 million
licenses in 2008 as compared to the 274 Notices of Intent to use the
statutory license filed with the Copyright Office.106 However, it is
doubtful that this private licensing scheme would operate so
automatically were it not for the shadow cast by the statutory license.
The terms of the mechanical license largely mirror the statutory
license except that the terms of payment are more flexible.107 In the
absence of a statutory license, master use and synchronization
licenses must be negotiated with the copyright owners.108 Surely, as
the Register in 1961 recognized, musical composers and music
publishers would want a right to refuse licensing to “irresponsible” or
“undesired” recordings.109 This interest in control does not appear to
be particularly strong, however, because there is little to no evidence
suggesting that songwriters have forsaken their craft or have chosen
not to release a particular song because another artist might record
and release it as a cover song.110

105.
Abrams, supra note 100, at 227 (“[T]he most salient fundamental aspect of the
compulsory license for the making of phonorecords of a non-dramatic musical composition is that
it sanctions the creation and exploitation of a derivative work without the authorization of the
copyright owner of the derivative work. None of the other compulsory licenses do so.” (footnote
omitted)).
106.
Id. at 237-39.
107.
See, e.g., Songfile FAQ, HARRY FOX AGENCY, http://www.harryfox.com/songfile/
faq.jsp#faq6 (last visited May 4, 2012) (offering lump sum payment for low-volume license under
HFA Songfile service); see also Abrams, supra note 100, (explaining that HFA licenses require
quarterly rather than monthly accounting as is required under section 115).
108.
See, e.g., Songfile FAQ, HARRY FOX AGENCY, http://www.harryfox.com/songfile/
faq.jsp#faq6 (last visited May 4, 2012) (explaining why HFA does not offer master use or
synchronization licenses) at http://www.harryfox.com/public/FAQ.jsp#10.
109.
Abrams, supra note 100, at 223 (quoting REGISTER’S REPORT, supra note 102, at 34).
110.
See discussion infra Part II.C.
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2. Section 110
Section 110 exempts an eclectic mix of public performances or
public displays from infringement liability.111
Two of these
exemptions, subsections 110(1) and 110(9), could serve as the
legislative building blocks for a broader statutory license for public
performances of various source works.112
Section 110(1) exempts from infringement liability
“performance or display of a work by instructors or pupils in the
course of face-to-face teaching activities of a nonprofit educational
institution, in a classroom or similar place devoted to instruction.”113
This provision does more than provide an exemption from paying a
license fee for performances that would not otherwise be fair use. It
also gives performing arts teachers, among others, creative license to
experiment with source works without requiring copyright owner
permission.114
Such experiments, however, are confined to the
classroom or similar places.115
Section 110(9) exempts from liability certain noncommercial
performances of a work (1) that the author has published at least ten
years prior to the performance and (2) that the user will perform as a
transmission directed to a print-disabled audience.116 A proponent of
a more general performance license could use this as a basis for
allowing public performance by transmission as well as live
performance. In addition, the ten-year, post-publication trigger for
the exemption is an unusual provision, but it might serve as a
potential source of compromise for a statutory license.117 Other
statutory licenses in the Copyright Act do not contain similar
temporal triggers.118
111.
17 U.S.C. § 110 (2006).
112.
Id. § 110(1), (9).
113.
Id. § 110(1).
114.
See id.
115.
Id.
116.
Id. § 110(9). Specifically, the exemption provides that the following is not an
infringement of copyright:
[P]erformance on a single occasion of a dramatic literary work published at least ten
years before the date of the performance, by or in the course of a transmission
specifically designed for and primarily directed to blind or other handicapped persons
who are unable to read normal printed material as a result of their handicap, if the
performance is made without any purpose of direct or indirect commercial advantage
and its transmission is made through the facilities of a radio subcarrier authorization
referred to in clause (8)(iii), Provided, That the provisions of this clause shall not be
applicable to more than one performance of the same work by the same performers or
under the auspices of the same organization.
Id.
117.
See discussion infra Part II.C.3.b.
118.
See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 114-116, 119, 122.
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3. Summary
Sections 115 and 110 identify particular circumstances in
which either an exemption or a statutory license circumscribes the
copyright owner’s control over a source work for the performing
arts.119
Section 115 licenses the creation and recording of
unauthorized derivative works on condition that the creator of the
recording provides notice and compensation to the owner of the
musical composition copyright.120 Section 110 exempts certain public
performances from the copyright owner’s exclusive rights to facilitate
performance of dramatic or musical works in educational settings or in
other gathering places that have received Congressional favor.121
C. Toward a More General Performance License?
Inspired by the rationale and examples of sections 115 and 110,
this Article argues that performers’ interest in access to source works
should receive more general legal recognition. Like the former
Register, however, many in the performing arts likely accept the
principle that playwrights, musical composers, and choreographers
should retain creative control over how others perform their
copyrighted works. The ideology of Romantic authorship runs strong
throughout this discourse, and those who perform the works of
canonical writers do so in service to such visions.122
Nevertheless, the mutual dependence between authors of
source works for the performing arts and those who render these in
performance requires distinct legal treatment from creative
interdependence in other contexts. Authors of source works are not
similarly situated to most other authors because their work is not
fully realized until it has been performed.123 The law should not give
one of these codependent parties the right to veto the creative
aspirations of the other, and the harms caused by copyright owners’

119.
Id. §§ 110, 115; see supra text accompanying notes 95-118.
120.
17 U.S.C. § 115; supra text accompanying notes 95-110.
121.
17 U.S.C. § 110; supra text accompanying notes 111-18.
122.
See Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and
Liberal Values in Early American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186, 200-09 (2008).
123.
Authors of architectural works depend upon skilled laborers to fully render their
works as well. While conflicts between architects and building contractors over the rendering of
plans may bear some resemblance to the conflict addressed in this Article, building contractors
generally do not evaluate their work on the basis of their creative interpretation of the plans. As
a result, this difference between performers and building contractors justifies excluding
architectural works from those that would be subject to the statutory license contemplated in
this Article.
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content-based license conditions or refusals to license are problems
that deserve a legal solution.
This problem could be understood to be a form of economic
inefficiency if, on average, the benefits of allowing a wide range of
performing arts organizations and their audiences (to enjoy the same
kind of creativity in the ways in which public domain texts, such as
Shakespeare’s plays, are rendered) outweigh the diminution in an
author’s incentive to compose. This is the argument that caused
Congress to retain the statutory license in section 115.124 There is
little or no evidence to suggest, however, that songwriters value their
right of control so highly that they would forsake their craft or choose
not to release a particular song because a third party might record and
release it as a cover song. Similarly, it strains credulity to think that
playwrights and choreographers would be dissuaded from creating
new works because those works would be subject to a statutory
license.125
In addition, the current hierarchy creates an unjust
distribution of power among cocreators. Performers seek to engage
with their audiences. Audiences often want to see familiar works
performed. As a result, performers need access to these compositions
to do so. Giving the author of such a text a veto right over a director’s
or performer’s ability to realize her creative vision is a form of
government-backed censorship, even if it is done for the asserted
higher purpose of promoting progress through authorial control over
the use of the author’s creative expression by others.
1. License or Exception?
However conceived, do the problems with the current
discrepancy require a statutory license or an exemption from liability
as a response? There may be reasons to broaden some of the
circumstances in which royalty-free public performance is appropriate,
either through an amendment of section 110 or through a robust
interpretation of fair use.126 But, as a general matter, the argument
for a statutory license is more persuasive because the source work
contributes significantly to the value of the performance, and the
composer of the source work should enjoy economic rewards for

124.
See Abrams, supra note 100, at 225.
125.
See Valenzi, supra note 12, at 789-92 (advocating the theoretical benefits of
instituting a compulsory licensing scheme in the theatre industry).
126.
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (limiting exclusive rights to allow for royalty-free use of
copyrighted expression without permission when balance of four factors favors the use).
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contributing this value to the performance.127 Unlike the section 110
exemptions discussed above, which are limited to noncommercial
performances,128 this license should also be available to performing
artists who seek commercial advantage from their live or recorded
performances.129 Like the license in section 115,130 this license should
also require payment even if the performance is for a noncommercial
or charitable purpose and is not otherwise exempt from liability. The
goal of this license would be to remove an author’s right to veto a
production for content-based reasons, but performers should still be
required to recognize the important contribution the source work
makes to a production by providing compensation to the author of the
source work. If Congress creates a statutory license, several issues
will arise: What subject matter of works should be subject to the
license? What is the license’s scope and duration? By what procedure
can a performer invoke the license? The next Sections explore these
issues and analyze the policy options Congress should consider when
designing such a license. While not advancing a legislative proposal
at this time, the remainder of this Article takes a position on some of
these policy trade-offs and concludes that further study of the likely
economic effects of such a license is warranted while insisting that the
problem of unequal treatment of codependent creators requires a
solution.
2. Subject Matter
At a minimum, the license should apply to dramatic literary
works, musical works, pantomimes, and choreographic works because
these are source works characterized by the condition of mutual
dependence between composer and performer for full realization.
Other literary works, such as novels and short stories, would not be
subject to statutory licensing, even in an unusual case in which a
performer demanded a right to record or otherwise perform the work:
an audiobook is one example of such a work. Authors of these works
do not depend upon performers to realize their works, and therefore
the condition this Article contemplates as the basis for tailoring
copyright does not apply to these nondramatic literary works.

127.
See, e.g., id. § 801(b)(1)(A)-(D) (describing that the calculations of royalties should
reflect the creative and economic roles both the copyright holder and user contribute to the
creative expression).
128.
Id. § 110; supra text accompanying notes 111-18.
129.
See infra p. 826 (discussing commercial application of contemplated statutory
license).
130.
17 U.S.C. § 115; supra text accompanying notes 95-110.
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Somewhat more challenging is the issue of whether such a
license should extend to already-recorded performances, such as
motion pictures and sound recordings. In the case of a sound
recording, a performer already may recreate sounds found on the
recording or create derivative works therefrom by virtue of the limits
on the exclusive rights in sound recordings in section 114(b).131 With
respect to motion pictures, two issues arise: First, although the license
would apply to the screenplay for a film, if the screenplay has not been
published, may the licensee reverse engineer the script from the film
and then perform it, for example, as a play?132 Here, the answer
should be in the affirmative because the goal of the license is to
provide access to source narratives regardless of form, but this is a
tentative position because permitting the creation of this type of
derivative work differs from rendering a work designed to be
performed by others in performance. Second, even if the license
permits live performances of a derived movie script, may a director
remake the film under the license and distribute it analogously to
recorded cover songs under section 115? The answer to this second
question should be in the negative: this reaches too far. The
idea/expression dichotomy133 already provides filmmakers with
considerable range to make films similar to those already released. In
addition, the filmmaker is differently situated from stage directors
and actors because audience expectations differ. Theatre audiences
wish to see familiar plays, but movie audiences usually wish to see

131.
17 U.S.C. § 114(b). Section 114(b) provides:
The exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under clause (1) of
section 106 is limited to the right to duplicate the sound recording in the form of
phonorecords or copies that directly or indirectly recapture the actual sounds, fixed in
the recording. The exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound recording
under clause (2) of section 106 is limited to the right to prepare a derivative work in
which the actual sounds fixed in the sound recording are rearranged, remixed, or
otherwise altered in sequence or quality. The exclusive rights of the owner of
copyright in a sound recording under clauses (1) and (2) of section 106 do not extend to
the making or duplication of another sound recording that consists entirely of an
independent fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate
those in the copyrighted sound recording. The exclusive rights of the owner of
copyright in a sound recording under clauses (1), (2), and (3) of section 106 do not
apply to sound recordings included in educational television and radio programs (as
defined in section 397 of title 47) distributed or transmitted by or through public
broadcasting entities (as defined by section 118(f)): Provided, That copies or
phonorecords of said programs are not commercially distributed by or through public
broadcasting entities to the general public.
Id.
132.
This is not a hypothetical example. A college theatre group that could not obtain a
license for the script to a popular film approached the author and asked whether it would be fair
use for them to create their own script from the film.
133.
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (excluding ideas from copyright’s exclusive rights).
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new films.134 In addition, the law has not considered remaking a film
as one of the performing arts.
3. Triggering Conditions
a. Bargaining Breakdown
Although neither the license in section 115 nor the exemptions
in section 110 contains conditions with bargaining breakdown to
trigger their application, other statutory licenses either allow the
terms of a negotiated license to trump the terms of the statutory
license,135 or commence the rate-setting proceeding after requiring a
period for voluntary negotiation.136 A reason to favor some bargaining
as a condition of the license is that it allows the author of the source
work to arrive at a price through negotiation if she does not seek to
impose content-based restrictions on the licensee. Allowing the price
to differ based on relative bargaining strength also is preferable under
traditional economic reasoning because the parties are better situated
than the government to value the transaction. Finally, a number of
authors, particularly playwrights, already have agreed to
standardized pricing in a number of cases.137 This Article’s proposal
would seek to avoid disturbing the terms of these licenses to the
extent that the prices reflect market realities and do not impose
content-based restrictions on licensees.138 The challenge is that an
author set on imposing content-based restrictions could readily impose
these under the guise of price negotiations.
For this reason, if Congress were to enact a general
performance license, its terms should grant the license to use the
source work while leaving price as the only open term. This approach
would be consistent with that taken for the statutory licenses subject

134.
Cf. Associated Press, ‘The Lion King’ Passes ‘The Phantom of the Opera’ as
Broadway’s All-Time Box Office Champ, NYDAILY NEWS (Apr. 9, 2012, 12:59 PM), http://www.
nydailynews.com/entertainment/music-arts/lion-king-passes-phantom-opera-broadway-all-timebox-office-champ-article-1.1058630 (noting that The Lion King recently ousted The Phantom of
the Opera as Broadway’s highest-grossing show).
135.
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(3) (“License agreements voluntarily negotiated at any
time between 1 or more copyright owners of sound recordings and 1 or more entities performing
sound recordings shall be given effect in lieu of any decision by the Librarian of Congress or
determination by the Copyright Royalty Judges.”).
136.
See, e.g., id. § 803(b)(3).
137.
See, e.g., Nonprofessional Licensing, supra note 61 (providing for standard licensing
agreements drafted by the Dramatists Play Service).
138.
In the Dramatists Play Service example, standardized pricing has been achieved,
but significant content-based restrictions also are imposed. See supra note 61-63 and
accompanying text.
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to the proceedings in section 803.139 If the parties fail to agree on a
price through good faith negotiations, the price would be subject to
arbitration with both parties equally bearing the costs. In the event
the arbitrator found that one of the parties had not negotiated in good
faith, the arbitrator would impose the total costs of arbitration on that
party.
However, some of the target beneficiaries of this proposed
license would be educational and community performing arts
organizations, which generally lack the resources to engage in
extended negotiations or arbitration.140 Therefore, the license should
include some form of collective negotiation that would result in a
menu of prices related to the relative wealth and the size of audience
served. Standardized pricing already available supports the viability
of such a menu.141
b. Temporal Trigger
The complications inherent in a bargaining precondition are
sufficient to require consideration of alternative triggering events for
the license’s availability. At a minimum, the license should not be
available until after the first performance authorized by the copyright
owner in the source work. Part of the justification for the license is
that audience expectations make the performers dependent upon the
authors of known works.142 This can occur only after the audience has
become familiar with the work, and it should be the right of the author
to have the work first performed under the terms of a negotiated
license. For recorded performances, the threshold condition for the
license should be the copyright owner’s first authorized public
distribution of copies, public exhibition, or public performance. Such a
condition would be analogous to the trigger for the section 115
statutory license.143
Persuasive arguments support two other conditions on the for
the availability of the license, one of which would delay availability
and the other which would allow the license to operate prior to the
source work having been made public by the copyright owner. On the

139.
See 17 U.S.C. § 803 (setting forth procedures to be followed by Copyright Royalty
Judges).
140.
See Valenzi, supra note 12, at 781 (describing how the current licensing system for
theatre provides access to performance licenses for amateur theatres that would otherwise lack
the resources to negotiate on their own).
141.
See, e.g., id. at 779-81 (detailing the standardized scheme for licensing the stock and
amateur performance rights of plays and musicals by theatrical licensing houses).
142.
See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
143.
See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
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one hand, allowing the first public performance of a work to be the
trigger seems too soon, particularly as applied to theatrical
productions. Current licensing practice distinguishes between “First
Class” and “Subsidiary” rights, in which the former grants rights to
perform in a “first class” theater, usually in New York or London and
possibly through a national tour; whereas, subsidiary rights cover all
other licensing opportunities, including licenses for amateur and stock
productions.144
Producers generally hope that a “First Class”
production will be sufficiently popular to justify formation of a touring
company and a national tour.145 The author of the source work should
be able to enjoy the market success of the first run on negotiated
terms without having to face competing versions of the work. If a time
delay is appropriate, a set period of time after the first public
performance or public distribution of copies of a recorded performance
would be better than some fact-sensitive determination about when
the author has had her first bite at the apple. This would also have
the advantage of triggering the license in the case of works for which
the “first run” arguably does not end, such as The Mousetrap, The
Bald Soprano, or Shear Madness.146 The timing of any delay should
be based on market data about the average length of a work’s first
public exposure. In addition, ten years, as used in section 110(9),147
should be the outer limit. In the theatrical context, the statutory
license generally would not affect licensing of “First Class” rights, but
would have an impact on licensing of “Subsidiary” rights, particularly
licensing of amateur and stock productions.
What about an unpublished and unperformed work of a famous
author who has passed away? Should the copyright owner be under
144.
See, e.g., DONALD C. FARBER, PRODUCING THEATRE: A COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL AND
BUSINESS GUIDE app. E (2006) (reproducing Dramatists Guild’s Approved Contract for Musical
Plays, which defines First Class Performance and Subsidiary rights). The first live production
within a specific territory often is licensed as “First Class Performance” rights, as differentiated
from “Subsidiary” rights for follow-on uses after the first production.
145.
See Patrick Healy, Broadway Musicals Hang on for Payoffs Beyond Weekly Gross,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/21/theater/godspell-sister-act-andpriscilla-push-through-the-winter.html?pagewanted=all (explaining that producers are
extending Broadway runs to give productions “hit” status, in order to increase touring revenues).
146.
See About the Show, SHEAR MADNESS, http://www.shearmadness.com/about-theshow.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2012) (“Shear Madness is listed in the Guiness [sic] Book of
World Records as the longest running play in the history of the USA.”); Mousetrap History, ST.
MARTIN’S THEATRE, https://www.the-mousetrap.co.uk/online/default.asp?doWork::WScontent::
loadArticle=Load&BOparam::WScontent::loadArticle::article_id=3453A9C0-5E53-4598-BD95A64E14E61259&menu_id=C6AD551F-D15A-4A13-ACBE-C234F7B6209E (last visited Apr. 12,
2012) (noting that The Mousetrap has been continuously running at St. Martin’s Theatre in
London for thirty-eight years); Theatre de la Huchette Review, FODOR’S TRAVEL GUIDES: PARIS,
http://www.fodors.com/world/europe/france/paris/review-117764.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2012)
(noting that Paris’s Theatre de la Huchette has staged The Bald Soprano since 1957).
147.
See 17 U.S.C. § 110(9) (2006).
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some “working” requirement to stage the work or record its
performance within a specific period of time before the license is
triggered? Such a working requirement is more familiar in patent
law.148 Nevertheless, one can find a precedent for such a requirement
in the Berne Appendix. Under the terms of the Appendix, a Member
State may provide for the grant of a statutory or government license to
substitute a license for the exclusive right of translation in
educational text, provided it has not been translated and published in
the local language within a set period of time.149
Where the author intended the work to be performed, a
working requirement is desirable as a means of bringing the work to
the public in a timely manner. Where the author did not want the
work performed, however, the work probably should not be subject to
the statutory license. Distinguishing between these two cases could
be very difficult in practice, and therefore it would be preferable to
exempt unpublished works from the statutory license.
4. Scope
Once available, what would the license allow? There are
roughly five variables. In its broadest form, the license could allow:
(1) live public performance of the work, (2) recorded performance
(whether of a live performance or a specially recorded version), (3)
communication to the public by broadcast or transmission of either
live or recorded performance, (4) public distribution of copies of any
recorded performance, and (5) the right to secure copyright in any
derivative works created by the performer. The drafter could pare
back the license from its broadest form either by dropping one or more
of the five rights or by imposing a noncommercial limitation on the
exercise of one or more of these. In its narrowest form, the license
would be limited to noncommercial live performance. This modest
reform would broaden section 110(1) by removing the limitation on
where the performance takes place.150
As attractive as the broad-form license would be to a director or
performer, the scope appears overbroad to achieve a balance of
creative control, at least at the outset. In particular, authorizing the
claim of a derivative-work copyright by the director or the performers
without consent of the author of the source work would go too far, at
148.
See Patent Law art. 83 (B.O.E. 1998, 26-3) (Spain) (“The owner of a patent shall be
obliged to work the patented invention either himself or through a person authorized by him, by
implementing it in Spain or on the territory of a Member of the World Trade Organization in
such a manner that the working is sufficient to satisfy demand on the national market.”).
149.
See Berne Convention supra note 8, app. art. II(2)(a).
150.
See 17 U.S.C. § 110(1).
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least in the early period during which the license is in effect. The
author of the source work should have some leeway to refine and
amend the text based on reactions to early performances, and to own
the rights in these derivatives free from potentially competing claims
from directors or actors who have adapted the work in performance.
On the other end of the spectrum, the narrow version of the license
would be insufficient to fulfill its purpose.
The baseline license should provide at least the director and
company in an educational or community theatre with the rights
customarily expected by these groups. This baseline license would
grant the director and performers the rights to: (1) publicly perform
and prepare derivative works for live performance, (2) authorize
recordings of such live performances, and (3) distribute copies of such
live performances—at least to the friends and family of the live
audience—so long as it is not by general distribution, broadcast, or
transmission (e.g., via YouTube). Formally, the license agreements for
community and educational theatre license the right of public
performance and do not grant any rights to record or distribute
recordings.151
It is nonetheless common practice to make and
distribute such recordings.152 The statutory license under discussion
would bridge this gap between law and practice by licensing these
common practices.
Two other variables regarding the scope of the license require
further attention: First, should the statute limit the license to
noncommercial performances? Second, should the license permit
public broadcast or transmission of the performance or general
distribution of copies of the recorded performance?
While the
noncommercial performance is the more sympathetic case, the license
should not be limited to only noncommercial performances. The
argument that motivates discussion of a statutory license is grounded
in recognition that professionals who specialize in producing
performances are dependent on source works. Since many of these
professionals perform in a commercial context, limiting the license to
151.
See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs): My Daughter is Playing Maggie in
CAT ON A HOT TIN ROOF. May I Videotape This?, DRAMATISTS PLAY SERVICE, INC.,
http://www.dramatists.com/faqsmanager/applications/faqsmanager/index.asp?ItemID=19
(last
visited Apr. 25, 2012) (“This may seem harmless enough, but the answer to this question is very
likely to be no. Dramatists Play Service, however, does not control this set of rights. We only
handle English-language stage performance rights to the plays that we publish.”); How to
License a Musical, MUSIC THEATRE INT’L, http://www.mtishows.com/content.asp?id=3_1_0 (last
visited Apr. 25, 2012) (explaining the process for obtaining a performance license).
152.
See, e.g., Search Results for “Hairspray High School Production”, YOUTUBE,
http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=hairspray+high+school+production&page=1 (last
visited Apr. 24, 2012) (delivering 413 results of primarily high school productions in response to
search query “hairspray high school production”).
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noncommercial performances would not enable talented commercial
creators to realize their respective creative visions.
With respect to uses of the source work outside of live
performance, the three principal options include allowing the licensee
to: (1) broadcast or transmit live performance or recorded live
performances only, (2) record performance and distribute copies of the
recordings only, or (3) broadcast or transmit performance plus
distribute copies of recorded performances. Each of these uses
currently is the subject of negotiated licenses and care needs to be
given to the impact that a statutory license would have on these
licensing markets. In addition, collective bargaining agreements
between producers and performers’ unions usually address the issue of
recordings and uses of recordings, and the interaction between a
statutory license and the process by which the parties reach these
types of agreement should be considered. The argument for including
the right to broadcast or transmit live performance in the statutory
license is strongest because doing so would share the live event with a
broader audience who would otherwise be unable to enjoy it. The
argument for also including the right to record and distribute
recordings would be analogous to the success of the market for
cover-song recordings in the shadow of section 115.153
Furthermore, taking into account the costs of complexity, a
license that grows in scope over time could reasonably balance the
interests in this context.154 For example, the license could extend only
to a live performance for a certain period of time before being
broadened to include broadcast, transmission, and distribution rights.
Indeed, in light of the very long duration of copyright, the claim for a
director’s or a performer’s derivative-work copyright would become
more sympathetic after the passage of a substantial period of time
after the author first publicly performed or released the work: perhaps
the longer of twenty-five years or the life of the author.
III. CONCLUSION
Copyright law treats creative collaborators in the performing
arts differently from other collaborative creators; it grants its full
range of exclusive rights to authors of source works while limiting its
grant of rights to all others involved in rendering these works in
performance. This unequal treatment of mutually dependent creators
153.
Further study of whether the market for recorded performance of drama, dance, and
the other performing arts is sufficiently analogous to the market for recorded music may be
needed to support this extension.
154.
Cf. Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775, 787-92 (2003);
Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 449, 478 (2002).
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is problematic, particularly when the author of a source work imposes
content-based restrictions on how the work may be rendered in
performance. And yet Congress can craft a statutory license that can
mitigate this unequal treatment. While not advancing a legislative
proposal at this time, this Article explores how and why Congress
could craft such a license and justify it by reference to the statutory
license for making sound recordings of nondramatic musical works in
section 115 of the Copyright Act and to the exemptions to the public
performance right found in section 110. This topic requires further
study of the potential market impacts of such a license, but the fact
remains that this problem is in need of a solution.

